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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Shuttle Discovery lifted off from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
7:47 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on October 6, 1990. During the countdown, a
short hold for weather and minor technical problems delayed the launch by 12 minutes
beyond the 7:35 a.m. EDT launch window opening. The primary objective of the
STS-41 mission was deployment of the Ulysses Spacecraft, which was successfully
accomplished. Because a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) is used to
provide power for Ulysses, the launch was subject to White House approval; the
approval letter was issued on September 21, 1990, by the Executive Office of the
President, Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Ulysses and its booster stages were deployed from Discovery's payload bay at 1:48
p.m. EDT, at the beginning of the fifth orbit when the Shuttle was over the Pacific
Ocean between Guam and Hawaii. The first of the two stages of the Ulysses Inertial
Upper Stage (IUS) booster fired at 2:53 p.m. EDT, followed by the IUS second stage
firing at 2:57 p.m. EDT. The Payload Assist Module (PAM-S) then ignited at 3:01 p.m.
EDT; Ulysses separated from the PAM-S at 3:11 p.m. EDT. At PAM-S burnout, the
geocentric velocity of Ulysses was 34,130 miles per hour, the fastest departure speed to
date of any spacecraft leaving the Earth.
The two-stage IUS and the single-stage PAM-S boosted Ulysses on a trajectory
that will take it to Jupiter in 16 months. A trajectory correction maneuver is planned
for October 15-16, 1990, to fine-tune the Ulysses initial flightpath toward Jupiter.
Following that operation, each of the spacecraft's 9 instruments will be turned on over a
6-1/2-week period. Upon arrival at Jupiter, the spacecraft will make some scientific
studies of the giant planet and receive a gravity assist from Jupiter into a solar orbit
almost perpendicular to the plane in which the planets orbit. Ulysses is scheduled to
make its first observations of the sun's southern pole between June and October 1994
and continue on to observe the northern solar pole between June and September 1995.
On Flight Day 2, Ulysses deployed its radial boom, a 5.6-meter (18.2-foot) beam
carrying a number of sensors for the spacecraft's science instruments. This slowed the
spacecraft's spin rate from 6.8 revolutions per minute (rpm) to 4.7 rpm, as planned. As
Ulysses flew toward Jupiter, the astronaut crew undertook their middeck experiments.
After a successful flight of slightly over 4 days, Discovery landed on orbit 66 on
concrete runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base at 9:57 a.m. EDT on October 10, 1990.
Exterior inspection of Discovery found the vehicle in exceptionally clean condition; only a
few minor dings to the tiles were found. Discovery tested new carbon brakes which may
eventually allow the Space Shuttle to land at KSC. The initial assessment was that the
brakes performed well, but no decision will be made until spring as to when Shuttles will
land in Florida.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting the STS-41 flight were also documented prior to the STS-41 Hight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and prior to the STS-41 Launch Minus Two
Day (L-2) Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance
against safety risk factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to
the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk leveI change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
12, Scope
This report addresses STS-41 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have impact on this flight, and factors
that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too Iate for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a brief mission description, including launch data,
crew size, mission duration, launch and landing sites, and other
mission- and payload-related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-41 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-41
flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-41.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-31 mission, the previous Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-31
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-103).
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-41
mission. Those IFAs considered to represent a safety risk will
be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-41 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-41 Mission
Space Shuttle Discovery lifted off from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
7:47 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on October 6, 1990. During the countdown, a
short hold for weather and minor technical problems delayed the launch by 12 minutes
beyond the 7:35 a.m. EDT launch window opening. The primary objective of the
STS-41 mission was deployment of the Ulysses Spacecraft, which was successfully
accomplished. Because a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) is used on
Ulysses to provide power, the launch was subject to White House approval; the approval
letter was issued on September 21, 1990, by the Executive Office of the President, Office
of Science and Technology Policy.° (See Section 8 for a copy of the approval letter.)
During ascent, Flash Evaporator System (FES) primary "A" system shut down.
The crew switched to the FES primary "B" system, which operated successfully. Once on
orbit, FES "A" was activated and worked properly. It was believed that subcooling
during ascent caused the FES "A" shutdown; past history has indicated occurrence of a
similar problem.
Ulysses and its booster stages were deployed from Discovery's payload bay at 1:48
p.m. EDT, at the beginning of the fifth orbit when the Shuttle was over the Pacific
Ocean between Guam and Hawaii. The first of the two stages of the Ulysses Inertial
Upper Stage (IUS) booster fired at 2:53 p.m. EDT, followed by the IUS second stage
firing at 2:57 p.m. EDT. The Payload Assist Module (PAM-S) then ignited at 3:01 p.m.
EDT; Ulysses separated from the PAM-S at 3:11 p.m. EDT. At PAM-S burnout, the
geocentric velocity of Ulysses was 34,130 miles per hour, the fastest departure speed to
date of any spacecraft leaving the Earth.
The two-stage IUS and the single-stage PAM-S boosted Ulysses on a trajectory
that will take it to Jupiter in 16 months. A trajectory correction maneuver is planned
for October 15-16, 1990, to fine-tune the Ulysses initial flightpath toward Jupiter.
Following that operation, each of the spacecraft's 9 instruments will be turned on over a
6-1/2-week period. Upon arrival at Jupiter, the spacecraft will make some scientific
studies of the giant planet and receive a gravity assist from Jupiter into a solar orbit
almost perpendicular to the plane in which the planets orbit. Ulysses is scheduled to
make its first observations of the sun's southern pole between June and October 1994
and continue on to observe the northern solar pole between June and September 1995.
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Downlink TV of the Ulysses deployment showed a shiny crescent-shaped object
near the spacecraft. Initial evaluation of the object using the Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) camera and the crew camcorder indicated that the debris was a curved-shaped
object approximately 21.6" long. Forward bulkhead camera views indicated that the
object appeared behind the right Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod near the
vertical stabilizer. The origin of the object is still unknown. The objeet's size and shape
does not correlate to any known item lost in the payload bay at KSC. The aft CCTV
did not detect the object until after the IUS had cleared the payload bay. A similar
piece of debris was observed on the STS-33 mission at payload bay door opening,
originating from the aft end of the vehicle (not the payload bay). Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) and Boeing will conduct further analyses to attempt to identify the
source of this debris.
On Flight Day 2, Ulysses deployed its radial boom, a 5.6-meter (18.2-foot) beam
carrying a number of sensors for the spacecraft's science instruments. This slowed the
spacecraft's spin rate from 6.8 revolutions per minute (rpm) to 4.7 rpm, as planned. As
Ulysses flew toward Jupiter, the astronaut crew undertook their middeck experiments.
After a successful flight of slightly over 4 days, Discovery landed on orbit 66 on
concrete runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base at 9:57 a.m. EDT on October 10, 1990.
Exterior inspection of Discovery found the vehicle in exceptionally clean condition; only a
few minor dings to the tires were found. Discovery tested new carbon brakes which may
eventually allow the Space Shuttle to land at KSC. The initial assessment was that the
brakes performed well, but no decision will be made until spring as to when Shuttles will
land in Florida.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: October 6, 1990
• Launch Time: 7:47 a.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: KSC Shuttle Landing Facility
• TAL Site: Banjul, The Gambia
• Alternate TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Concrete Runway 22
• Landing Date: October 10, 1990
• Landing Time: 9:57 a.m. EDT
• Mission Duration: 4 Days, 2 Hours, 10 Minutes
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 28.45 Degrees
• Altitude: 160 Nautical Miles Circular/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-103 (11) Discovery
SSMEs: (1) #2011, (2) #2031, (3) #2107
ET: ET-39
SRBs: BI-040
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #14
MLP: MLP #2
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DISCOVERY OV-I03
ENGINE #2011 #2031 #2107
POWERHEAD #2016 #2028 #2014
MCC* #4005 #2019 #4002
NOZZLE #4016 #4017 #4019
CONTROLLER F24 F27 F25
FASCOS* # 17 # 12 #29
HPFTP* #5203R 1 #4010R3 #6003R 1
LPFTP* #2030 #2120R 1 #4007
HPOTP* #2027R2 #2521R 1 #2305R3
LPOTP* #2126 #2120 #2216
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.2.1 Partially Fixed Orifice Flow Control Valves
STS-41/OV-103 was the first Space Shuttle to fly with partially fixed orifice
Gaseous Oxygen (GO2) Flow Control Valves (FCVs). The current active GO 2 FCVs used
in the External Tank (ET) Liquid Oxygen (LO2) tank pressurization system will be
replaced by Main Propulsion System (MPS) GO2 fixed orifices. The GO2 FCVs are used
to return gas from the Main Engines back to the ET to maintain ullage pressure. The
fixed orifice has been approved for Space Shuttle fleet implementation pending
operational assessment and performance verification [Program Requirements Control
Board Document (PRCBD) $50509R2]. Approval was based on results of the feasibility
assessment performed by Space Shuttle Engineering/Level II and the supporting
contributions of the MSFC ET Project. Incorporation of the fixed orifice hardware and
procedures into the MPS eliminates some of the Criticality (Crit) 1 and 1R failure
modes associated with the current FCVs which include the valves, the associated
electronics, and the pressure-sensing transducers.
Flight tests with the FCVs shimmed for intermediate flow rates will be used to
verify the analytical model and the f'mal orifice size selection. The FCV stroke between
high-flow and low-flow positions will be gradually changed over the course of 3 flights
until the valves are fixed in one position. The ET GO2 vent/relief valve pressure was
increased from 24 pounds per square inch gage (psig) to 31 psig on STS-41 by replacing
the spherical spring sensing assembly. This reduced the minimum ullage pressure from
16.0 psig to 14.2 psig, reducing 4 Crit 1R failure modes to Crit 3, and eliminating the
effect of 15 other failure modes. The 31-psig GO2 vent/relief valve was test qualified.
The step #1 FCV orifice configuration was installed on STS-41/OV-103. These orifices
were shimmed to 93% for high flow and 55% for low flow. The schedule leading to the
implementation of fixed FCVs has been interrupted due to unavoidable shuffling of the
Shuttle manifest. Final implementation of fixed orifices in GO2 FCVs has not been
scheduled.
2.2.2 First Flight for Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Field Joint Protection System
STS-41 Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) had the redesigned Field Joint Protection
System (FJPS) on all field joints. This was the first flight for the redesigned FJPS.
Original plans called for flying the redesigned FJPS on a field joint prior to full
implementation on the STS-41 flight set. This was to occur on STS-38, which has the
redesigned FJPS installed on 1 aft field joint; however, STS-38 was delayed until after
STS-41. The FJPS redesign eliminates the need to install the moisture seal and vent
valve, resulting in a reduction of installation time from 144 hours (hr) per joint to
approximately 67 hr. This design also eliminates the need for use of extruded cork, a
manufacturing savings.
The Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) reviewed the redesigned
FJPS and concluded that the design does not increase the risk of debris formation.
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2.2.3 Software Upgrade for Orbiter Avionics and Space Shuttle Main Engine
Controllers.
STS-41 was the first flight to use the new OI-8D software that was developed from
the O1-8C base. Some of the areas in which capabilities were improved or added are
Sequencing, Guidance and Navigation, Transatlantic Abort Landing, Systems
Management, and Reconfiguration Data.
This was also the first flight of the AR01 upgraded Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) controller software. This upgrade acids monitoring capability to the controller
software in preparation for the Block II controller. Capabilities not currently in the
Block I controller have been inhibited. Verification testing of AR01 uncovered a
problem with monitoring of the Pogo Precharge Pressure. This problem was fixed for
STS-41.
2.2.4 External Tank Tanking Lightning Constraint
A change to the electrical storm activity constraint for ET tanking was in effect for
STS-41. For the previous flight, STS-31, the requirement was verification that no more
than a 20% probability existed for potential electrical activity within 5 miles of the
launch pad during the first 4 hr of ET tanking. For STS-41 and subsequent missions,
the first 4 hr of ET tanking condition is reduced to the first hr of ET tanking. This
change was promulgated by Requirements Change Notice (RCN) $59684 and approved
by the August 2, 1990, Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB).
The rationale for this change was:
• Present pad lightning protection is adequate:
I
Lightning masts (pad and ET)
Catenary system
Ground systems incorporate protection.
• Prediction accurac), improved for the first hr of tanking.
This change provides increased assurance that tanking can be accomplished
effectively at KSC during summer months.
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2.2.5 Contingency Return of Ulysses Results in Exceedance of Orbiter Downweight
Restrictions.
The Orbiter is currently certified to vehicle downweights specified in VE3-90-006.
There was the potential that a contingency return with Ulysses might be required.
Returning with Ulysses placed the combined vehicle downweight at 235,000 pounds (lb);
this is above the 230,000-1b limit. Rockwell performed an extensive analysis to
determine the impact of a contingency return with Ulysses. The analysis indicated that
there were no issues with flight performance and control, vehicle venting, or increased
thermal loads. All increased loads were within certification limits and previous flight
experience. There was, however, a requirement for a 155-minute thermal
preconditioning prior to reentry. This requirement was planned into the STS-41 nominal
end-of-mission attitude timeline. To protect the structural Factor of Safety (FOS) of 1.4,
additional limits were imposed. A 1.98-g normal load limit around the heading
alignment circle was specified to maintain the 1.4 FOS. Limits for touchdown sink
speed were specified at 6.0 feet per second (fps) for no crosswind and 5.0 fps for
crosswinds up to 20 knots. Exceeding these limits was not considered a safety-of-flight
issue, because the resulting forces would yield and not fail Orbiter structural members.
If Ulysses was returned and the loads were less than specified, a zonal (visual)
inspection would have been required. If loads were determined to be greater than or
equal to the above, a detailed inspection would have been necessary prior to the next
OV-103 flight.
The results of the downweight analysis did not impact the planned landing site
priority. STS-41 end-of-mission landing site priorities were as follows:
• Edwards AFB Concrete Runway
• Edwards AFB Lakebed
• KSC Concrete Runway
• Northrup
For Return-to-Launch Site (RTLS), the weight exceeded the 240,000-1b limit by
approximately 970 lb. A waiver, PRCBD H42041M, was approved by Level I that
allowed an RTLS abort downweight of 241,500 lb for STS-41 only. However, STS-41
was successfully launched, and Ulysses was successfully deployed. Therefore, Orbiter
downweight was not a concern for STS-41.
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2.2.6 Interruption of STS-41 Stacking Operations.
During the stacking of STS-41 boosters, the decision was made to roll the partially
completed stack to Pad 39B to make room in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to
roll back STS-35 after identification of a hydrogen leak. The Left-Hand (LH) booster,
including the forward assembly, was completely stacked, and all joints had been closed
out; however, stiffener ring splice plates had not been installed. The Right-Hand (RH)
booster had been stacked only to the ET attach ring at the aft field joint. The
remaining RH booster segments were either at the surge facility or on railcars awaiting
offload. The partially complete STS-41 stack was at Pad 39B for approximately 9 days.
The partial RH stack was covered with various layers of protection. Lightning
detectors were installed on each booster. While at Pad B, no unusual environmental
conditions were recorded, and no lightning strikes were recorded on either of the
4 detectors installed. Inspection upon return to the VAB found no discrepancies or
environmental damage. The STS-41 stack was cleared for flight.
2.2.7 Use of Lightweight Solid Rocket Motor Segments.
STS-41 was the first mission since STS-31 to use lightweight SRM segments.
Deviation RDW-587R1 for the use of lightweight segments was approved through
STS-31. This deviation was revised and approved at Level III as RDW-587R5 for the
lightweight SRM segments assigned to STS-39, STS-40, and STS-41. SRM Hazard
Report FC-02 will be updated to reflect the extension of this deviation. There was no
increase to the risk baseline associated with this deviation.
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2.3 Payload Data
Payload Bay:
• Ulysses - (See Section 2.4)
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV) Experiment - The SSBUV
payload is mounted in 2 Get-Away-Special containers. This experiment will
help to fine-tune the atmospheric ozone measurements made by Advanced
TIROS-N (ATN) satellites already in orbit by providing a calibration of their
backscatter ultraviolet instruments.
Intelsat Solar Array Coupon (ISAC) - Samples of solar array materials,
mounted on Discovery's Remote Manipulator System (RMS), are designed to
study the interaction of atomic oxygen wear on solar panels in preparation
for a future Shuttle mission to rescue the stranded Intelsat satellite.
Middeck:
Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space (CHROMEX) - A study of
plant root growth patterns in microgravity.
Voice Command System (VCS) - A development experiment in voice
command of the Shuttle's onboard television cameras.
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE) - A study of flames in
microgravity.
Investigation into Polymer Membrane Processing (IPMP) - A study of
materials processing in microgravity.
Physiological System Experiment (PSE) - An investigation of how
microgravity affects bone calcium, body mass, and immune cell function.
Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME)-III - Records radiation levels in
orbit.
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) - Technology
development/geophysical environment study to calibrate AMOS ground-
based electro-optical sensors and study on-orbit plume phenomenology using
the Shuttle as a test object.
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2A Ulysses Description
Space Shuttle STS-41/OV-103 deployed the Ulysses spacecraft on a 5-year journey
to the sun. Ulysses is a joint mission conducted by the European Space Agency (ESA)
and NASA to study the polar regions of the sun and the interplanetary space above the
poles. The spacecraft will be the first to achieve a flightpath nearly perpendicular to the
ecliptic, the plane in which Earth and the other planets orbit the sun. Throughout its
5-year mission, Ulysses will study three general areas of solar physics: the sun itself, the
magnetic fields and streams of particles generated by the sun, and the interplanetary
space above the sun.
The Ulysses spacecraft, a ground control computer system, and a spacecraft
operations team were provided by ESA. The Space Shuttle launch, tracking, and data
collection during the mission are performed by NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL). Scientific instruments aboard the craft were provided by scientific teams in both
Europe and the United States.
Communication with Earth is maintained via a 5.4-foot diameter, parabolic high-
gain antenna. The spacecraft's telecommunications system includes two S-band
receivers, two 5-watt S-band transmitters, two 20-watt X-band transmitters, the high-gain
antenna, and two smaller low-gain antennas. The high-gain antenna is used to transmit
in either S-band or X-band as well as to receive in S-band. The low-gain antennas are
used both to transmit and receive in S-band. The spacecraft can transmit to Earth on
2293.148 Megahertz (MHz) in S-band or 8408.209 MHz in X-band.
The Ulysses power source is an RTG, similar to RTGs flown on previous solar
system exploration missions. RTGs are required for these deep-space missions because
solar arrays large enough to generate sufficient power so far from the sun would be too
large and too heavy to be launched by available means. In the RTG, heat generated by
the natural decay of plutonium-238 is converted into electricity by thermocouples.
Ulysses' scientific payload is composed of 9 instruments. In addition, the
spacecraft radio will be used to conduct a pair of experiments over and above its
function of communicating with Earth, bringing the total number of experiments to 11.
Also, two other investigation teams will conduct interdisciplinary studies. The
experiments are listed below.
• Magnetic fields
• Solar-wind plasma
• Solar-wind ion-composition spectrometer
• Heliospheric instrument for spectra, composition, and anisotropy at low energies
• Energetic-particle composition and neutral gas
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• Cosmic and solar particle investigation
• Solar X-rays and cosmicgamma rays
• Unified radio and plasma-waveexperiment
• Cosmic dust
• Coronal sounding
• Gravitational waves
In addition to the 11 experiments listed above, two investigation teams will study
the following interdisciplinary topics.
• Directional discontinuities
• Mass loss and ion composition
Summary descriptions of these experiments are included in the background data
referenced in Section 8. For more detailed descriptions of the Ulysses experiments,
refer to Ulysses payload documentation.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-.41 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-41 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-41 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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Section 4:
SRM 2
ITEM COMMENT
Resolved STS-41 Safety_ Risk Factors
STS-31 right Solid Rocket
Motor (SRM) igniter
adapter-to-forward dome
joint putty blowhole.
Blowholes through the igniter outer joint
putty was observed on both STS-41
SRMs (360Q013). The blowholes,
sooting, and damage to the outer gasket
seal retainer cadmium plating were
similar to that seen on previous flight
SRMs (including STS-31 and STS-36)
and test motors. See Section 7, SRM 1
(IFA No. STS-41-M-01) for a detailed
description of the damage incurred as a
result of the putty blowholes on STS-41
SRMs.
The increase in putty blowhole
occurrences is believed to be related to
the reduction in putty layup in the
igniter joints. The reduction in putty was
implemented to reduce the probability
for putty to extrude into the joint sealing
surface, as seen on STS-33.
A redesign of the igniter-to-dome joint
has been approved to delete joint putty.
(IFA No. STS-41-M-01)
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Section 4:
SRM 4
ITEM COMMENT
Resolved $TS-41 Safety Ri_k F_ct0r_
Aft dome factory joint
internal insulation voids.
Abnormal erosion was found at the
forward edge of the internal insulation
on both SRM aft dome-to-stiffener and
stiffener-to-stiffener factory joints on
STS-41. However, postflight
investigation determined that minimum
erosion safety factors were met or
exceeded in both areas. Verification
was performed on all aft SRM segments
using ultrasonic inspection techniques to
verify insulation integrity. The concern
was the effect that voids would have on
maintaining the required 2.0 erosion
safety factor in the aft dome factory
joint insulation.
Postfire insulation samples were taken
from all SRMs. These samples had
small, entrapped air voids. None of
these were considered to be folds,
bulges, or thin spots in the insulation.
Voids have always been localized and
are surrounded by rubber-tearing
vulcanized bonds that do not propagate
or communicate. Voids are in
compression during motor operation.
The minimum SRM insulation erosion
safety factor over the aft dome joint has
been determined to be 3.46 based on
postfire evaluation of 400 insulation
samples. It is relatively certain that all
SRMs have had similar aft dome factory
joint insulation voids. (See Section 7,
SRM 2 for more details.)
(IFA No. STS-41-M-02)
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S¢_tion 7:STS-41 Inflight Anomalies
Integration 2 Aft compartment
Hydrogen (H2)
concentration high during
ascent.
(IFA No. STS-41-I-03)
COMMENT
Postflight analysis of STS-41 aft
compartment catch bottle contents
indicated the highest ascent H2
concentrations of any Shuttle mission.
Leak rate calculations based on H2
concentrations in the STS-41 catch
bottles ranged from 25,000 standard
cubic inches per minute (scim) to 37,000
scim. Average H2 leakage during ascent
for the fleet is less than 10,000 scim.
Prior to STS-41, the maximum catch
bottle H, concentration was on STS-31,
the last OV-103 mission. Leak
calculations based on the STS-31 sample
resulted in an estimated leak rate of
30,000 scim. A leak greater than 59,000
scim, coupled with a sufficient amount of
Oxygen (O2), is considered to be the
minimum flammability limit. Through
the 11 OV-103 flights, there has been a
trend of increasing H_ concentrations in
the catch bottles.
At present, the cause of the leakage is
unknown, and there were no indications
of any leakage prior to launch. A
possible leak source is the Space Shuttle
Main Engines (SSMEs). Prior to engine
start, only approximately 5% of the
SSME H2 joints are wetted. The 3
SSMEs on STS-41 have been on OV-103
for 3 flights, and all will be removed.
Because of the potential for leakage,
special tests, including bagging each
SSME individually, will be performed.
Additionally, all Main Propulsion System
and SSME interface joints will be leak
checked prior to SSME removal.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-41 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-41. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific problem.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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The following risk factors contained in this section represent a low-to-moderate
increase in risk above the Level I approved Hazard Baseline risk. The NASA safety
community assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated
increase was acceptable.
Integration 1
Integration 2
Orbiter 1
Orbiter 3
Orbiter 7
Orbiter 11
Orbiter 12
Difference between the Primary Avionics Software System
and Backup Flight System could lead to recontact between
the Orbiter and External Tank after separation.
Liquid Oxygen fill and drain valve closure in the event of
power loss in terminal sequence.
OV-102 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue.
STS-41/OV-103 Freon Coolant Loop #1 leak.
OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak.
Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-41 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
Difference between the Primary Avionics Software System and
Backup Flight System could lead to recontact between the Orbiter
and External Tank after separation.
Liquid Oxygen fill and drain valve closure in the event of power loss
in terminal sequence.
Liquid Hydrogen leaks on STS-35/OV-102 and STS-38/OV-104.
PAGE
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ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
OV-102 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Aluminum rivets installed in the wing assembly without proper heat
treatment and corrosion protection.
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue.
Wing struts below-minimum wall thickness.
Potential damage to right-hand Payload Bay Door resulting from the
Orbiter Processing Facility access bridge incident.
Primary Reaction Control System LIA thruster leak.
STS-41/OV-103 Freon Coolant Loop #1 leak.
Main Propulsion System joint weld issue.
Left-Hand External Tank umbilical door actuator anomalies.
Cracks in Auxiliary Power Unit dynatube fittings.
OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak.
Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects.
SSME
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump bearing etching/corrosion issue.
Rigid fuel bleed duct stress corrosion cracking, engine #2029.
High-pressure fuel duct flange radius cracking.
SRB
1
2
Hydraulic system Quick Disconnect spring anomalies.
Hydraulic fluid spill in the left-hand Solid Rocket Booster aft skirt.
4-11
4-12
4-14
4-15
4-18
4-19
4-21
4-23
4-25
4-26
4-27
4-29
4-32
4-34
4-36
4-38
4-40
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-41 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
SRM
1
2
3
4
5
Putty on igniter inner gasket of test motors.
STS-31 right Solid Rocket Motor igniter adapter-to-forward dome
joint putty blowhole.
Debris in the Solid Rocket Motor nozzle flex bearing cavity.
Aft dome factory joint internal insulation voids.
Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator leak test.
PAGE
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4-44
4-45
4-47
4-49
PAYLOAD
1 Ulysses Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Pressure Relief
Device fastener failure.
4-51
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SECTION 5
STS-31 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-31/OV-103 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-31 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 speed control failure.
Reaction Control System thruster L3A anomalies.
Supply water tank "C" bellows anomaly.
Water Spray Boiler #2 vent heater "A" did not respond on orbit.
Fuel Cell #2 Oxygen flow rate was high during purge.
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 pump bypass heater "A" failed on.
Air Data Transducer Assembly #3 circuit breaker contamination.
Missing seal material from trailing edge of elevon flipper doors #5
and #6.
PAGE
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5-5
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
5-10
5-11
KSC
1
Engine #2031 High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump seal fragments.
Main Propulsion System Liquid Oxygen outboard fill and drain valve
close failure.
5-13
5-15
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SECTION 6
INFLIGHT ANOMALIES FROM PREVIOUS OV-103 FLIGHT
The STS-31 mission was the previous Space Shuttle flight as well as the previous
flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-103). The Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-31/OV-103 mission are presented in Section 5.
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SECTION 7
STS-41 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of In_flight Anomalies (WAs) arising from the
STS-41/OV-103 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. The Hazard
closure classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for
each HR listed.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-41 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
I
2
3
PAGE
System Management Nominal Bus Assignment Table General Purpose 7-3
Computer #2 assignment anomaly.
Aft compartment hydrogen concentration high during ascent. 7-4
Left-hand Solid Rocket Booster aft strut separation device NASA 7-5
Standard Initiator detonator separated from the pressure cartridge.
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater system "B"
failed "on" during STS-41.
Inertial Measurement Unit #1 experienced Z-axis accelerometer
transients.
Backup Flight Software backup cabin delta-pressure/delta-
temperature alarm was triggered at Main Engine Cutoff.
STS-41 Commander's left-hand Attitude Direction Indicator rate scale
switch failure.
Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Hydrogen aft attach/separation hole
plugger failed.
STS-41 left-hand Rotational Hand Controller trim inhibit switch
indicated a contact miscompare.
7-7
7-9
7-10
7-10
7-11
7-12
SRM
1
2
Solid Rocket Motor igniter outer joint putty blowholes with cadmium
plating damage and sooting.
Abnormal erosion on Solid Rocket Motor aft segment factory joint
internal insulation.
7-14
7-16
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
The following letter is the launch approval for the Ulysses mission issued on
September 21, 1990, by the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
a°m°
ADI
ADTA
AFB
AMOS
AOA
AOS
APU
AR
ATN
ATP
BB
BFS
BSR
C
CA
CCTV
CHROMEX
CRES
Crit
CRT
DEU
DPS
EDT
EIU
ESA
ET
F
FASCOS
FC
Before Noon (Ante Meridiem)
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Air Force Base
Air Force Maui Optical Site
Abort-Once-Around
Acquisition of Signal
Auxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Advanced TIROS-N
Acceptance Test Procedure
Barrier-Booster
Backup Flight Software
Backup Flight System
Bite Status Register
Controlled
California
Closed Circuit Television
Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space
Corrosion Resistant Steel
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Data Entry Unit
Display Electronic Units
Data Processing Software System
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
European Space Agency
External Tank
Fahrenheit
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Fuel Cell
A-1 STS-41 Postflight Edition
FCL
FCS
FCV
FD
FDA
FES
FJPS
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
fps
FRR
GE
GG
GGVM
GH_
GO2
GOAL
GOX
GPC
GSE
H2
HDP
HGDS
HPFTP
HPOTP
HR
hr
ID
IFA
IMU
in-lb
INTG
IPMP
ISAC
IUS
JPL
JSC
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Freon Coolant Loop
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciator
Flash Evaporator System
Field Joint Protection System
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
feet per second
Flight Readiness Review
General Electric
Gas Generator
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Ground Operations Aerospace Language
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hydrogen
Holddown Post
Hazardous Gas Detection System
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hazard Reports
Hour
Inside Diameter
Inflight Anomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inch-Pound
Integration
Investigation into Polymer Membrane Processing
Intelsat Solar Array Coupon
Inertial Upper Stage
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
A-2 STS-41 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Kbit
KSC
L-2
lb
lb/hr
LCC
LD
LH
LH2
LO2
LOX
LPFTP
LPOTP
LPS
LSFR
MCC
ME
MECO
MEOP
MET
MHz
min
MLP
MMT
MPS
MSE
msec
MSFC
N 2
NASA
NBAT
NM
NSI
NSRS
Kilobit
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
Pound
Pounds Per Hour
Launch Commit Criteria
Leak Detector
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Process Sequencer
Launch Processing Set
Launch Site Flow Review
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Main Engine
Main Engine Cutoff
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure
Mission Elapsed Time
Megahertz
Minute
Mobile Launch Platform
Mission Management Team
Main Propulsion System
Mission Safety Evaluation
millisecond
Marshall Space Flight Center
Nitrogen
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nominal Bus Assignment Table
Nautical Mile
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
0 2
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
OPO
ORBI
OSMQ
OD
OV
p°m.
P/N
PAM
PAR
PASS
PCV
PLBD
POR
ppm
PRCB
PRCBD
PRD
PSE
psi
psia
psig
QD
RCN
RCS
RH
RHC
RI
RM
RME
RMS
rpm
RSRM
RTG
RTLS
Oxygen
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
Orbiter Project Office
Orbiter
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Outside Diameter
Orbiter Vehicle
Afternoon (Post Meridiem)
Part Number
Payload Assist Module
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Primary Avionics Software System
Pulse Control Valve
Payload Bay Door
Power-On Reset
Parts Per Million
Program Requirements Control Board
Program Requirements Control Board Document
Pressure Relief Device
Physiological System Experiment
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Quick Disconnect
Requirements Change Notice
Reaction Control System
Right-Hand
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Radiation Monitoring Equipment
Redundancy Management System
Remote Manipulator System
Revolutions Per Minute
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return-to-Launch Site
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
S/N
SAIL
sccm
SCCS
scim
see
SEM
SII
SM2
SOV
SRB
SRM
SSBUV
SSCE
SSME
SSRP
TAL
TEM
TFL
TSM
TVC
USBI
VAB
VCS
WSB
Serial Number
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
standard cubic inches per minute
Second
Scanning Electron Microscope
Solid Rocket Motor Igniter Initators
Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator
System Management
Shutoff Valve
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet Experiment
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Test Evaluation Motor
Telemetry Format Load
Tail Service Mast
Thrust Vector Control
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Vehicle Assembly Building
Voice Command System
Water Spray Boiler
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